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RECENT DECISIONS
"view can be said to be erroneous: one, recognizing a man's right to
make a will and wishing to protect devisees and legatees under a
will, places the burden of proof on the contestant; the other, recogniz-
ing the interests of the heirs, and wishing to make positive the fact
that the testator really made a will in accordance with the statutory
requirements, places the burden upon the proponent. Both are correct.
In regard to those courts which have confused the idea of "burden
of proof," a note in the Michigan Law Review. offers a sage sugges-
tion:17 "If for reasons of policy or expediency the courts think it de-
sirable to protect wills by placing the burden of proof on the con-
testant throughout they should express these reasons instead of bol-
stering up their opinions with doubtful arguments as to the shifting
of the burden of proof during the trial, or giving probative force to
presumptions of testamentary capacity."
William J. Fish and Francis P. Kelly.
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INNIKEEPERS-INJURY TO PROPERTY or GUEST-CAmE REQuIRED or INNKEEPER.
-Action of tort for damages sustained by the plaintiff whose fur coat was burned
when a toy balloon exploded in the defendant's restaurant. The balloon, filled
with gas, unknown to the plaintiff, exploded when it was touched with a lighted
cigar by another patron. The defendant was held liable for the damage sustained
by the plaintiff. The court said that "since the presence of the plaintiff in the
restaurant of the defendant was a benefit to each, the defendant was under the
obligation to use reasonable care to see to it that portions of the premises where
the plaintiff was specially or impliedly invited to go were reasonably safe for
ber use .... The defendant was also obligated not, without warning, to.expose
the plaintiff to a danger existent on the premises which was known or ought to
diave been known by the defendant but was not known or was not of such a
character that it should have beenknown to the plaintiff." Robinson v. Weber
Duck Inn Co., 1 N. E. (2d) 27 (Mass. 1936).
In Del Rosso v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 200 N. E. 277 (Mass. 1936), the
plaintiff, a patron in a basement restaurant owned and operated by the defendant,
was injured by jumping and falling when a rat came from the kitchen and ran
under the table where she was eating her lunch. The court held that she could
not recover, as she did not show that the defendant had not attempted to keep
its premises free from rats and as she did not show whether the presence of rats
on the premises was known to the defendant.
An innkeeper or hotel keeper is under a duty to provide reasonably safe
premises for his guests, which they may be expected to use in the ordinary way
and in the ordinary manner. This duty is imposed by law and is not contractual.
Dye-Washburn Hotel Co. v. Aldridge, 93 So. 512 (Ala. 1922); INNxmx . s, 14
R. C. L. 508. The innkeeper or hotel keeper is not an insurer of the safety bf
his guest; his responsibility is limited to the exercise of ordinary care. Burgauer
v. McClellan, 265 S. W. 439, 440 (Ky. 1924). Liability is limited to those con-
17 Op. cit. supra note 7.
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sequences which can reasonably be forseen or anticipated by a person of ordinary
prudence. Cumberland Hotel Operating Co. v. Hartman, 94 S. W. (2d) 637, 641
kKy. 1936).
As a general rule, in the law of negligence, the defendant is under a duty to
protect the plaintiff against the reasonably expectable conduct of third persons,
if the defendant ought reasonably not to expose the plaintiff to such conduct.
This rule has been applied in many jurisdictions. In an Iowa case a motorman
left a street car unguarded on a grade and a passenger released the brake; the
court held that the jury might properly find that some such happening was for-
seeable and so was a risk that made the motorman's conduct negligent. Klieben-
stein v. lowa R. & Light Co., 193 Iowa 892, 188 N. W. 129 (1922). In a New
Jersey case a passenger, in attempting to have her baggage checked, was knocked
down and injured in a railroad depot by cabmen who were engaged, in sport,
in scuffling; the court held that evidence of similar occurrences was admissible
to show the danger to passengers existing there and to show that the defendant
had knowledge of them and so was bound to use reasonable care to protect pas-
sengers from such dangers. Exton v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 62 N. J. Law
7, 42 Atl. 486, 56 L. R. A. 508, BomHasN, CASES ON TORTS (3rd ed.) 179 (1899).
In an Irish Free State case the defendants failed to provide a platform and hand-
rail for travelers, as an ordinance required while their premises were undergoing
repairs; the plaintiff, a -traveler on the premises, was run over by motor lorry
carelessly driven by a third person; the jury found that the failure to have the
platform and handrail directly conduced to the plaintiff's injury, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. McKenna v. Stephens
[1923] I. R. 2 K. B. 112. Extreme examples of this doctrine are to be found in
those cases holding that criminal acts of third persons, induced by the defendant's
conduct, may be forseeable. An English case held that one who had negligently
recommended a stock broker was liable for the money of the customer embezzled
by the broker. De La Bere v. Bearson [1907] L. R. 1 K. B. 483. A South Car-
olina case held that a railroad company which caused its employees to work in
its yards at night, with knowledge that its yards were a customary resort for
criminals who gathered there to rob the cars, was liable to an employee who
was shot by a robber with whom he came in contact in the course of his em-
ployment. Green v. Atlantic & Charlotte Air Line R. Co., 131 S. C. 124, 126 S.
E. 441, 38 A. L. R. 1448 (1925).
David A. Gelber.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-INJuRIES DuE To FAnuRE To REPnm.-The plain-
tiff, as tenant, brought a tort action to recover for personal injuries sustained
as the result of the alleged negligence of the defendant, who was the landlord of
the dwelling 'house. The rights of the parties arose from the relationship of land-
lord and tenant. The defendant obtained the house through a foreclosure sale,
and at that time it was in need of repairs. Part of the house consisted of front
and back piazzas; to reach both the downstairs and the upstairs tenements, an
ascent of stairs was necessary. The plaintiffs agreed to rent the house from the
defendant bank, and the agreement was that plaintiff was to repair the place,
the bank furnishing the materials, and also making an allowance on the rent,
and giving the plaintiff a small payment each month for his services. This contract
was terminated sometime later, and the bank by its officers agreed to finish the
repairs, and did make some repairs. Sometime afterwards, the plaintiffs, on leaving
their dwelling place, were walking on the back piazza; here the wife stepped on
a board that was decayed and fell forward down the stairs and was injured. The
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defective part of the piazza was a part of the building that the defendants had
intended to repair. Held, that the defendant, in failing to make repairs on the
piazza, where the plaintiff was injured, was not liable for the injuries received
by her. Andrews v. Leominster Savings Bank, 5 N. E. (2d) 50 (Mass. 1936).
There is no implied warranty in the letting of premises that they are reason-
ably fit for use. In the absence of an express warranty or deceit the lessee as-
sumes the risk of the quality of the premises he leases. Tuttle v. George H. Gil-
bert Manufacturing Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N. E. 465 (1887). The ordinary xe-
lation of lessor and lessee gives rise to no obligation on the part of the lessor to
keep the premises in repair or in the same condition they were in when let to
the tenant. Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mss. 405, 92 N. E. 496, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.)
798 (1910).
It is the duty of the lessor to inform the lessee of concealed defects in the
premises, which a careful examination by the tenant would not reveal and which
are known to the lessor, in order that the lessee may guard against them. Suna-
sack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N. E. 1039 (1902); Miner v. McNamara, 81 Conn.
690, 72 Ati. 138, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 477 (1908). Contra: Land v. Fitzgerald, 52
Atl. 229 (N. J. 1902), holding that since the lease contained no express or im-
plied promise that the premises were safe, the tenant could not recover for a
personal injury due to the unsafe condition of the premises that was known to
the landlord and not known or discoverable by ordinary care by the tenant.
Where the landlord warrants the safe condition of the demised premises, he
is subject to liability to the tenant for a personal injury due to a defect in the
premises, if the defect amounts to a breach of the warranty. Ousley v. Hampe,
128 Iowa 675, 105 N. W. 122 (1905).
As a general rule, under the ordinary contract of the landlord to repair prem-
ises let to a tenant, there is no liability in tort to the tenant for personal injuries
resulting from the want of repair. Such injuries are generally regarded as too
remote to be recovered for on breach of the contract. The ordinary duties arising
from the relation of landlord and tenant are not increased by such a contract
with respect to the obligation of the landlord to provide for the personal safety
of the tenant. So it makes no difference whether the form of the action be ex
delicto or ex contractu, as the gravamen of the action in either case would be
breach of a contract. If, however, the contract to repair amounts to a covenant
to keep the premises reasonably safe, or if the contract was made under circum-
stances reasonably indicating that damages for personal injuries were contemplated
by the parties at the time of the making of the contract, or if there is some duty
resting on the landlord to make the repairs (the want of which produced the in-
jury) not arising from a contract, then there is liability for the personal injuries
sustained from a failure to make the repairs that brought about the personal in-
jury sustained. See discussion in Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404, 407, 408
(1909).
For a breach of the ordinary contract of a landlord to make repairs, the fol-
lowing remedies are open to the tenant: (1) The tenant may abandon the prem-
ises, if they become untenantable by reason of the want of repair; (2) The
tenant may make the repairs himself and deduct the cost from the rent; (3) The
tenant may occupy the premises without repair and recoupe his damages in an
action for rent; and (4) The tenant may sue for damages for breach of covenant
to repair, and the damage recoverable is usually the difference between the value
of the premises in repair and the value of the premises out of repair. See discus-
sion in Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404, 408, 409 (1909).
The mere fact that the landlord states that he will repair the premises is not
sufficient to create liability for an injury due to disrepair of the premises, be-
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cause such a promise is gratuitous. However, where performance of a gratuitous
promise to repair is entered upon by the defendant, then he is -bound to use
due care in -performance and the tenant, if he relies on such repairs, may have
a cause of action. Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477 (1870). The landlord is at
liberty to repudiate his gratuitous promise or to perform it, but if he does under-
take to perform it he is obligated to use due care as to the manner of its per-
formance. In the absence of contractual obligation, the landlord is liable to iis
tenant only for acts of misfeasance-not for nonfeasance (Ward v. Fagin, 101
Mo. 669 (1890)); and recovery, if any may be had against him, must be founded
on the law of negligence, and does not rest upon the theory of an implied con-
tract. Russell v. Little, 22 Idaho 429 (1912); LAxDLoPD AND TENANT, 16 R. C. L.
§ 555.
However, there is a distinction to be drawn where the parts of the premises
that have been leased involve a common entran-,e, or stairway, or something of
that nature, which is to be used by all tenants In such cases the duty to re-
pair, at the common law, is not upon the tenants but upon the landlord; this
appears to be the general rule. Sawyer v. McGullicuddy, 17 At. 124 (Me. 1889).
Francis A. Dunn.
Wxz--E r cr or CONVEYANCE or RPA. ESTATE DVISFD AND Irs REAcQumS-
TION By TESTATR.-In 1919 the testator devised all -of his real estate and per-
sonal property to D. This was a general devise. In 1921 the testator conveyed
his real estate to the devisee (D.), who later reconveyed it to the testator. In
1933 the testator died owning this real estate and without republishing his will.
Held, that the real estate passed to D. under the will. Strang v. Day, 362 Ill. 110,
199 N. E. 263, 103 A. L. R 1215 (1935).
Prior to the Statute of Wills of 1540 in England the 'power to devise real
property (except by some particular custom) did not exist, because the feudal
system required livery of seisin to effect a conveyance and wills were regarded
as conveyances. The Statute of Wills provided that "every person and persons,
having manors, lands, tenements or heriditaments," should have the power to
devise the same. But it was held that where a testator devised lands of which he
was not seised at the time, they did not pass under his will. Brinker v. Cook,
11 Mod. 121, 88 Eng. Rep. 940 (1707). There the court pointed out that to hold
otherwise would be contrary to reason and against the known rules of the com-
mon law of England, and that the Statute of Wills, which gave the power to
devise lands, enabled only persons having lands at the time a will was made to
devise them.
Under the Statute of Wills a conveyance of land, after it had been specifically
devised by the grantor, constituted an implied revocation of the devise. Two rea-
sons were given for this rule. (1) The will could not affect land acquired after
its execution, as a will was regarded in the nature of a conveyance of the land
devised, that is, as a title document. It could operate only upon the land -in
which the testator had an interest at the time of the execution of his will de-
vising the same. It was necessary that the testator should be seised of the land
at the time he made his will and that he should continue so seised without in-
terruption until his decease. Marey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 3 AUt. 636, 56 Am.
Rep. 538 (1885). (2) The conveyance of land which was the subject of a specific
devise indicated the testator's intention to revoke that part of the will. If, 'how-
ever, the testator republished the will with language properly including the re-
acquired property that he had devised, then the will operated to pass it to the
devisee.
